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Within the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic has been a
pioneer in reforming the system of health care finance. Since the introduction of
its compulsory health insurance fund in 1997, the country has gradually moved
from subsidizing the supply of services to subsidizing the purchase of services
through the ‘single payer’ of the health insurance fund. In 2002 the government
introduced a new co-payment for inpatients along with a basic benefit package.
A key objective of the reforms has been to replace the burgeoning system of
unofficial informal payments for health care with a transparent official
co-payment, thereby reducing the financial burden of health care spending for
the poor. This article investigates trends in out-of-pocket payments for health
care using the results of a series of nationally representative household surveys
conducted over the period 2001–2007, when the reforms were being rolled out.
The analysis shows that there has been a significant improvement in financial
access to health care amongst the population. The proportion paying state
providers for consultations fell between 2004 and 2007. As a result of the
introduction of co-payments for hospital care, fewer inpatients report making
payments to medical personnel, but when they are made, payments are high,
especially to surgeons and anaesthetists. However, although financial access for
outpatient care has improved, the burden of health care payments amongst the
poor remains significant.
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KEY MESSAGES
 The proportion paying state providers for outpatient consultations has fallen between 2004 and 2007. However, although
financial access for outpatient care has improved, the burden of health care payments amongst the poor remains
significant.
 As a result of the introduction of co-payments for hospital care, fewer inpatients report making payments to medical
personnel but when they are made, payments are high, especially to surgeons and anaesthetists. The overall out-of-pocket
costs of inpatient care have fallen and equity has improved.
 Kyrgyzstan provides a model that could be replicated throughout the region.
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Introduction
At independence, the Kyrgyz Republic inherited a health system
with universal access and services free at the point of delivery.
In common with other countries of the former Soviet Union
(FSU) in the years immediately following independence in
1991, the country experienced a major reversal in both
economic and social development. The economic upheaval
accompanying transition from a planned to a market-led
economy, the disruption of traditional trading partnerships
and the withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow following the
break-up of the FSU resulted in a dramatic drop in GDP and
central government expenditure. GDP fell by over 50% during
the first 5 years of transition. Although there was a return to
positive economic growth in the late 1990s, recovery has been
slow and in 2005 GDP per capita was US$1927 PPP (purchasing
power parity) (UNDP 2008). On the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index
(a composite measure of life expectancy, adult literacy and
educational attainment, and per capita GDP), at 0.696
Kyrgyzstan is now ranked 116th out of 177 countries worldwide
(UNDP 2008). It is estimated that just under half of the
population (46%) are living below the poverty line (NSC 2005).
Public spending on health care expenditure as a percentage of
GDP dropped from over 6% in 1994 to around 2% in 2000
(UNICEF 2009), and it is estimated that per capita government
expenditure on health in 2005 was just US$20 PPP (WHO
2008). The decline in government spending on health has been
accompanied by an increase in private expenditure by house-
holds, both in terms of official charges and, more commonly,
under-the-counter or informal payments. Informal payments
have been defined as ‘payments to individual and institutional
providers in-kind or cash that are outside the official payment
channels, or are purchases that are meant to be covered by the
health care system’ (Lewis 2002).
Evidence suggests that informal payments for health care
were extensive throughout Central Asia in the late 1990s
(Ladbury 1997; Ensor and Savelyeva 1998; Sari et al. 2002;
Falkingham 2004). Although in principle medical supplies and
drugs required as part of inpatient treatment remained free (or
included in a one-off co-payment), the scarcity of such items in
medical facilities led to an increasing number of patients
having to purchase them. Furthermore, local budgetary con-
straints and petrol shortages eroded the capacity of the
ambulance service, and often patients had to provide their
own transportation to medical facilities. Most importantly,
informal user charges for consultations were frequently being
imposed to help subsidize salaries. Although there is a tradition
in the region of presenting monetary or in-kind gifts to
caregivers as a mark of gratitude, evidence suggests that this
voluntary tradition was being supplemented or even supplanted
by provider-generated demands for payment as a precondition
of treatment (Sari et al. 2002). Informal payments tend to
penalize poor households and can have a significant impact on
access to health care services (Falkingham 2002).
Reform of health financing in Kyrgyzstan
The Kyrgyz government was amongst the first in the region to
explicitly recognize the negative impact on equity of informal
payments. Stemming the growth in out-of-pocket payments has
provided a key stimulus for reform of the health financing
system. A household survey revealed that, even as early as
1994, 69% of outpatients and 86% of inpatients in Kyrgyzstan
contributed something towards the cost of their care in what
were ostensibly free (except for some limited official user
charges) government health facilities (Abel-Smith and
Falkingham 1995). The growth of informal payments in
Kyrgyzstan was confirmed by subsequent household surveys,
and in 2001 virtually all patients were found to have paid
something towards their hospitalization (Falkingham 2001).
Qualitative research found that during their stay in hospital,
patients had to contribute to the costs of their care both in
terms of purchasing medicines, syringes and other supplies
such as IV tubes and bandages, but also paid for light bulbs,
linen and food (Schuth 2001).
In 1994, following the first survey on out-of-pocket payments,
the Ministry of Health requested technical assistance from the
World Health Organization (WHO) Regional office for Europe
to develop a comprehensive health reform programme, and in
1996 the national MANAS Health Care Reform Programme
(1996–2005) was adopted. Improving equity by guaranteeing
patient’s rights and access to existing health services was
highlighted as one of the four main policy goals of the
programme (Meimanaliev et al. 2005). A chronology of reforms
within the health sector in Kyrgyzstan is provided in Table 1.
The main thrust and novelty of the Kyrgyz reforms has been
the retention of the predominance of general tax financing
whilst introducing a new institutional arrangement as the
single purchaser of health care services for the whole popula-
tion (Kutzin et al. 2009).
The Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (MHIF), established
in 1997, introduced a new system of provider payment methods
that were aimed at increasing efficiency and responsiveness to
population and patient needs. These included case-based
payment for inpatient care and capitation payment for primary
care (Kutzin et al. 2002). Since then, the country has gradually
moved from subsidizing the supply of services to subsidizing the
purchase of services through the health insurance fund. In 2001,
a series of related changes were introduced under the rubric of
the ‘Single Payer’ reform. The reforms were implemented on a
phased basis, being introduced first in the pilot oblasts
(administrative regions) of Chui and Issyk-Kul (2001), then
extended to Naryn and Talas (2000), Jaladabad and Batken
(2003) and finally to Osh (late 2003/early 2004) and the capital
Bishkek (2004). The ‘Single Payer’ reform involved a radical
change in pooling arrangements for budget funds, comple-
mented by a unification of provider payment methods from
budget and MHIF revenues and measures to increase transpar-
ency of financial contributions by patients.
The Single Payer reform consolidated the split between
purchasers and providers, with the MHIF becoming the single
purchaser. In addition the reform introduced a State Guarantee
Benefit Package (SGBP) with free primary health care from a
contracted Family General Practitioner (FGP)/Family Medicine
Centre (FMC), with whom the insured person is enrolled, and a
formal co-payment for hospital inpatient care on referral. The
SGBP includes the list of people who are eligible for free or
nearly free provision of health care, i.e. exempt categories of the
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population based on individual or disease-specific characteris-
tics, such as Second World War veterans, low-income pension-
ers, cancer, TB, etc. In addition, SGBP includes the co-payment
rates that should be contributed by patients for inpatient care
and outpatient specialist services based on their entitlements,
and it also provides access to the Additional Drug Package
(ADP) for the outpatient (HPAU 2007).
By increasing the transparency of the co-payment system and
by improving the flow of resources to health care providers, it
was hoped that the health financing reforms would reduce or
even eliminate informal payments, particularly in hospitals. As
mentioned above, one of the key reasons for the growth of
informal payments, in addition to the need to purchase
supplies, was the demand for payments by health workers in
order to subsidize their salaries. According to official govern-
ment statistics, wages in the health sector have always been
below average for the country and had declined in relative
terms from 92% of the average wage in 1994 to just 51% by
2001 (NSC 2003). By allowing the co-payment made by
households to stay at the level of the facility and by introducing
a clear system of payments by the MHIF to providers, it was
anticipated that funding would be improved and so the need to
subsidize wages would be reduced.
This article examines recent trends in health care use and
out-of-pocket payments for health care over the period 2001–
2007; the same period of time that extensive health reforms
were taking place in Kyrgyzstan, including the Single Payer
reform. It is important to bear in mind that other changes in
the economy during this period may also impact upon both the
demand for medical care and the ability of households to pay
for care. For example, between 2001 and 2007, real GDP per
capita increased by 19% (UNICEF 2009). However, although it
is not possible to establish causality between the reforms and
trends in household spending on health care, the trends
nevertheless are instructive in helping to assess the extent to
which the Single Payer reform has achieved its aims of
replacing unofficial out-of-pocket payments with a transparent
official co-payment and reducing the financial burden of health
care spending for the poor.
Table 1 Chronology of events and legislation in the health sector
Date Event
August 1991 Declaration of independence of Kyrgyzstan.
1993 Introduction of user fees.
March 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between WHO Regional office for Europe and the Ministry of Health of
the Kyrgyz Republic to undertake the MANAS Health Care Reform Programme.
Ministry of Health requests technical assistance from USAID for a health insurance demonstration project
in Issyk-Kul oblast.
August 1994 National Health Policy approved by the government.
Nov 1996 Government approves MANAS Health Care Reform Programme.
World Bank funded Health Project (1996–2000) started in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek and Chui oblasts).
Jan 1997 Introduction of the mandatory health insurance system in Kyrgyzstan.
July 1997 MHIF introduces case-based payment to hospitals.
1977–1998 Rolling out of primary health care reforms to Chui, Jalal-Abad and Osh oblasts and Bishkek.
June 1998 Introduction of partial fundholding in 14 Family Group Practices (FGPs) in Karakol city, Issyk-Kul oblast.
Nov 1998–March
1999
FGPs enrolment campaign in Chui oblast and Bishkek.
Jan 1999 Introduction of capitation payment to FGPs in Bishkek.
April 1999 About 55 hospitals and 290 FGPs enter into contracts with the MHIF.
Jan 2001 Government decree on Introduction of a New Health care Financing Mechanism in Health facilities of
Kyrgyzstan since 2001.
Government decree on Programme of State Guarantees on Provision of Free and Exempt Health Care to
Citizens of Issyk-Kul and Chui oblasts in 2001.
Government decree on Population’s Co-Payment for Drugs, Meals and Certain Types of Health Services
Rendered by Health Facilities besides the Programme of State Guarantees on Provision of Free and Exempt
Health Care to Citizens of Issyk-Kul and Chui oblasts in 2001.
Feb 2002 Government decree on Provision of Health Care to Citizens of Kyrgystan under the State Benefits Package since 2002.
March 2002 Naryn and Talas oblasts join the single payer system.
March 2003 Batken, Jalal-Abad and Osh oblasts join the single payer system.
Nov 2003 Republican facilities join the single payer system.
July 2004 Law on the Single Payer System in Health Care Financing in the Kyrgyz Republic.
March 2005 Popular uprising and subsequently new government elected.
Feb 2006 Government approves ‘Manas Taalimi’ Health Care Reform Programme 2006–2010.
Source: adapted from Meimanaliev et al. (2005).
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Methods
This article analyses the health module of the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey (KIHS) conducted in March 2007 on behalf
of the Ministry of Health. Where appropriate, the results from
the 2007 KIHS are compared with those from the 2004 and
2001 KIHSs, which had the same design (Falkingham 2001;
Baschieri and Falkingham 2006). All three surveys were
conducted with financial assistance from the UK Department
for International Development (DFID) and were executed by
the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee (NSC) with interna-
tional technical assistance by the author.
The 2007 survey instrument was composed of five main
sections covering:
 general demographic information about the household and
its members;
 utilization of health care services in the last 30 days and
expenditure associated with such health care;
 hospitalization in the last year;
 knowledge of the household head regarding people’s rights
under the SGBP developed by the MHIF;
 self-reported health status of each household member over
18 years old and whether they were covered by the MHIF. In
addition, the questionnaire includes questions related to the
risk factors of cardiovascular diseases, such as hypertension,
overweight, smoking habits.
The questionnaire was administered to 5005 households
nationwide producing a sample of 21 257 individuals. The
KHIS sample design provides nationally representative data and
weights are provided to ensure the sample is representative at
the oblast level. The advantage of including the health
financing module within the regular KHIS is that it is possible
to link the health and health service utilization data to detailed
information on household income and expenditure over the
preceding year, allowing the calculation of the burden of health
care expenditure on households.
As the survey was conducted as part of the on-going KHIS,
where enumerators visit the same households on a monthly
basis to collect basic information on expenditure, it is unlikely
that the questions on payments for health care would be
affected by ‘courtesy bias’ that might affect similar surveys
conducted either within a health facility or as part of an exit
interview. Other non-sampling errors such as non-response and
recall error are also thought to be low.
Measuring out-of-pocket payments
There are four types of out-of-pocket payments for health care:
 informal under-the-counter payments in cash or kind for
services and goods in public health facilities that are meant
to be provided without payment;
 purchase of goods and services from private suppliers,
mainly outpatient drugs from private pharmacies and
bazaars, but also private health care;
 official user fees and official co-payments by patients to
health facilities included in the single payer system;
 gifts (which are not solicited and which may be in addition
to informal payments).
Distinguishing between formal and informal payments for
health services is complex (Lewis 2002). Although specific
questions were included in the KIHS on both official charges
for consultations with health professionals and the value of
unofficial ‘gifts’ (including money, food, jewellery, services,
etc.) made to medical staff for a consultation, it is likely that
some respondents could have been unclear whether ‘charges’
demanded by medical personnel prior to consultation were
‘official’ (i.e. legally sanctioned) or not. Thus it is difficult to
isolate formal co-payments from additional informal payments.
The status of out-of-pocket payments for drugs and medical
supplies is also ambiguous as such payments are only defined
as being informal payments if the government is meant to cover
the costs but fails to do so. The survey distinguishes between
payments for drugs covered under a prescription and other
drugs, but does not ask whether the respondent expected the
drugs to be provided free but had to pay for them. Thus it is
impossible to disentangle informal payments, formal payments
and private payments for pharmaceuticals. Similarly, the
in-kind provision of food, linen and personal care by relatives
during an inpatient stay in hospital may simply be seen as an
optional luxury for those who do not want to rely on standard
care. However, if these services are provided out of necessity by
relatives due to the hospital’s failure to provide them, then such
services become informal payments in kind. Again the survey
does not allow us to disentangle the motivation for relatives
providing in-kind services.
Finally, there is a tradition in Central Asia of presenting
monetary or in-kind gifts to caregivers as a mark of respect and
appreciation. During the soviet era it was common practice to
give medical personnel gifts of chocolates or flowers. The
questionnaire survey does attempt to differentiate between gifts
that were freely given and those that were coerced, asking a
series of questions on whether the gift was given before or after
the consultation (if given before, this may imply that the
patient is seeking to obtain some assurances about the quality
of the treatment to be provided rather than thanks for a
treatment received) and whether the gift was requested
outright, hinted at or freely given (see Box 1). As is good
practice in all questionnaire design, there is also the inclusion
of a category that allows the respondent not to answer.
‘Difficult to say’ is the equivalent of the traditional ‘don’t
know’ category and provides respondents with a way to decline
to answer as it is unlikely that they would not remember.
Given the difficulties in isolating informal payments from
official charges and gifts, the main analysis presented below
focuses not on informal payments per se, but on all
out-of-pocket payments incurred by individuals as a result of
using health care services. However, where possible, distinc-
tions between the different types of payments are made.
Results
Utilization of health care services
Table 2 presents some summary statistics on the use of health
services in the Kyrgyz Republic. Overall 9.6% of the population
sought medical assistance in the 30 days prior to the survey in
March 2007 and 6.8% had been hospitalized in the previous
year. Health care utilization varies by age (with use being
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highest amongst the young and the old) and by gender (with
more women consulting than men). There are clear regional
differentials, and utilization of primary care also varies by
socio-economic group, with those in the richest 20% of the
population (as defined by quintile group of per capita house-
hold expenditure) being more likely to seek medical assistance
than other groups. This pattern has also been found elsewhere
in the region (Falkingham 2004), and one possible explanation
for this is that people from the lower end of the welfare
distribution may be being deterred from seeking health care
due to its cost.
The advantage of a household survey rather than a
facility-based survey is that a household survey captures both
users and non-users of health care. In addition to the 7% of
Kyrgyz men and 12% of Kyrgyz women who reported in March
2007 that they had sought medical assistance in the previous 30
days, a further 13% of men and 21% of women reported that
they had needed medical assistance but had not sought
treatment. This is an increase on the proportions found in
previous surveys in 2001 and 2004. However, the main reason
given for not seeking health care in 2007 was that the person
self-medicated using either pharmaceuticals (82%) or herbs
(9%). Three per cent of men and 2% of women thought that the
problem would go away. Only 4% of both men and women
reported that they did not seek medical assistance because it
was ‘too expensive’.
In order to assess the success of the reforms in the health
sector, the ‘Manas Taalimi’ (national health reform programme
for 2006–2010) includes a number of ‘dashboard indicators’ in
a series of different domains. The first indicator for improving
‘accessibility and equity of health services’ is ‘the share of
population that did not seek necessary health care due to lack of money
and remoteness of health care facility’. According to analysis of the
2001–2007 KIHS, the proportion of the population that cited
‘expense’ or ‘distance to facility’ as the main reason for not
seeking care when they needed it has decreased significantly,
from 14.7% in 2001 to 5.7% in 2004 and to 3.6% in 2007. Thus,
on this indicator, it is clear that the recent health reforms have
made considerable progress in reducing financial barriers to
accessing health care in Kyrgyzstan. Below we examine
payments for health care in more detail to see if the reforms
have been successful in reducing or even eradicating informal
payments.
Paying for health care: the extent of out-of-pocket
payments
Primary care
Under the Single Payer reform, primary health care from a FGP
where a person is enrolled should be free. Previous research
analysing the results from the 2004 KIHS reported that the
proportion paying for primary health care increased between
2001 and 2004, despite the introduction of the reforms
(Baschieri and Falkingham 2006). Analysis of the 2007 survey
reveals the good news that the proportion of people who visited
an FGP where they were enrolled who reporting making any
payment has fallen from 17% in 2004 to 13% in 2007, and the
share of those paying at a polyclinic/FMC has fallen from 45%
Box 1 Questions regarding gifts to medical personnel
from the questionnaire of the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey 2007
13. Did [NAME] make any gifts (money, food, jewellery,
etc.) or provide any services to this person, besides the
payment? If yes, what was the value of the gift or
services?
14. Was the gift given before, during or after the
consultation?
Before . . . 1
During . . . 2
After . . . 3
Difficult to say . . . 4
15. Did [NAME] give it as a gift or was it requested by
the person?
It was a gift . . . 1
The person asked for it . . . 2
The person hinted for it . . . 3
Difficult to say . . . 4
Table 2 Health care use in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2007
% who sought
medical assistance
in last 30 days
% hospitalized
in last year
Age (years)
0–17 7.9 2.8
18–64 9.7 8.8
65þ 19.3 12.6
Sex
Male 6.7 4.3
Female 12.3 9.0
Type of residence
Urban 11.5 6.3
Rural 8.5 7.1
Place of residence
Issyk-Kul 11.7 8.5
Jala-Abad 8.7 3.5
Naryn 13.0 12.7
Batken 8.5 7.1
Osh 8.9 6.6
Talas 6.9 3.7
Chui 9.7 8.3
Bishkek 10.9 7.2
Quintile
Bottom 20% 7.6 5.6
Quintile 2 7.3 5.0
Quintile 3 11.6 5.3
Quintile 4 11.0 7.0
Top 20% 12.1 9.4
ALL 9.6 6.8
Source: authors’ own analysis 2007 KIHS.
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in 2004 to 23% in 2007 (Table 3). Furthermore, no-one in the
2007 survey reported making a payment for maternity care,
highlighting the success of the reforms in improving access to
antenatal care. The proportion paying also varied by the type of
personnel consulted, with those reporting paying to see a state
doctor falling from 21% to 13%, whilst those paying a private
doctor increased from 45% in 2004 to 67% in 2007.
A range of patients are exempt from making a co-payment,
either on the basis of suffering from a particular chronic illness
(e.g. diabetes, TB, asthma) or on the basis of being in a particular
category (children under 1 year, Second World War hero, regis-
tered disabled). The survey also provides some useful insights into
the functioning of the system of exemptions. In 2007, 27% of
those who fell into one of the ‘exempt’ categories sought medical
assistance; and these ‘exempt’ categories constituted 8% of all
consultations. Only 9% of exempt people reported making a
payment for a consultation compared with 21% of non-exempt
people. This is a significant improvement on the 15% of ‘exempt’
patients making a payment in 2004, indicating that the system of
exemptions is operating more effectively.
Once the co-payment has been made, in theory there should
be no other charges in relation to the consultation. In 2007, a
similar level of people reported that they made ‘other payments’
in connection with the consultation, such as those for
diagnostic tests, as was the case in 2004 (20% vs. 17%,
respectively). This is a marked reduction in comparison with
32% in 2001 and 55% in 1994. Moreover, fewer than 2%
reported presenting a gift to health personnel during the
consultation. In this respect, it appears that the new charging
mechanism of a single co-payment is working well.
Table 4 shows the total amount of money paid in relation to a
consultation, including travel, gifts and prescriptions. In 2007,
the mean amount paid in relation to a consultation, amongst
all who consulted a health professional, was 355 soms. In the
first quarter of 2007 the exchange rate was US$1 to 40 soms, so
this is equivalent to US$8.90. Over half of all people paid
nothing at all for any service, including transport to the
consultation, with the result that the median payment was
zero. Spending on prescriptions constitutes the largest share of
total expenditure (64%), followed by payments for consult-
ations (11%). The mean amount paid for a consultation was 38
soms, equivalent to around 3% of total monthly wages earned
by a health care professional.
Looking at the burden of health care expenditure, amongst
those who have consulted in the last month, spending on
outpatient care accounts for 34% of per capita household
Table 3 Percentage reporting paying for a consultation and average payments made, by type of medical personnel providing care and facility
visited, 2001, 2004 and 2007
% reporting paying for consultation Mean amount paid (soms) Median amount paid (soms)
2001 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Type of medical personnel consulted
Private doctor 46 45 67 132 441 60 100
State doctor 17 21 13 93 130 30 50
Nurse 19 12 8 129 82 35 100
Feldsher 33 32 27 130 85 200 60
Midwife 3 22 1 38 33 20 25
Pharmacist – – 1 – 60 – 60
Dentist 63 84 84 203 382 50 125
Healer 60 37 41 114 97 100 50
Other – – 4 – 50 – 50
Total 22 27 20 118 234 40 60
Type of facility visited
Patient’s home 19 19 8 117 102 30 100
FGP (enrolled) 10 17 13 44 86 25 50
FGP (not enrolled) 42 41 – 210 – 50 –
Polyclinic (without FGP)/FMC 28 45 23 105 131 40 50
SVA 19 30 – 37 – 30 –
FAP 18 21 6 42 121 20 50
Hospital 32 31 – 179 – 50 –
Private office 73 79 72 325 482 60 150
Maternity home 12 14 – 199 – 300 –
Other 49 36 19 187 244 100 200
Specialist in FMC n.a. 58 – 60 – 60 –
Specialist in private office n.a. 76 – 62 – 25 –
Total 22 27 20 118 234 40 60
Note: ANOVA for between group variation significant at P<0.001.
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expenditure amongst those from the poorest quintile compared
with just 16% amongst the richest (and 24% for all house-
holds). Thus in poor households, the ill health of one person
can account for around one-third of usual per capita consump-
tion. Although overall financial access for outpatient treatment
has improved, the burden of health care payments for the poor
is still significant.
Hospital care
As seen in Table 2, in the 12 months prior to the 2004 survey
6.4% of all respondents reported at least one hospital inpatient
stay. Of these, 7% were hospitalized twice and 4% three or more
times. The majority of people attended a hospital close to their
home, with the median distance travelled being just 8 km.
However, there was a very wide degree of variation, with a
minimum of 100 metres and maximum of 1100 km.
Hospitalization represents a major expenditure for most
households. As Figure 1 shows, although the proportion
paying hospital charges has increased between 2001 and
2007, the proportion reporting making payments for drugs,
laboratory tests and food has fallen, which suggests the single
co-payment policy is taking effect. Although this is excellent
news, it is important to note that there has been no fall in the
proportion reporting making payments to medical personnel.
Moreover, the proportion paying for medicines and other
services during hospitalization still remains high. In 2007,
amongst all inpatients, 65% reported paying for food, 65% for
medicines, 64% for hospital charges and 31% for laboratory
tests. Four per cent of hospital inpatients reported paying an
additional official charge for a comfortable room. Over half of
people paying hospital and laboratory charges reported that
they did not get a receipt, making it difficult to identify whether
these charges were formal or informal.
There is evidence that in 2007 a slightly lower proportion of
the poor paid hospital charges and for other services than the
rich (Table 5). Moreover, those in the lowest quintile paid, on
average, a lower amount. However, even then costs of charges
and medicines could be prohibitive. The median payment for
medicines for those in the lowest quintile was 500 soms, which
is in addition to the official co-payment of 500 soms.
Table 6 presents information on the proportion making a
payment/gift direct to staff during hospitalization. The differ-
ences by economic status partly reflect differences in the types
of treatment obtained during hospitalization. In general, a low
proportion of inpatients report making direct payments to staff.
However, when they do so, the size of the payments may
be considerable—especially to surgeons, where the median
payment is 1000 soms. There appears to be some evidence that
payments are solicited by hospital staff, particularly anaesthesi-
ologists, although in the majority of cases inpatients reported
that the payment was a gift (Table 7).
Overall, the mean total cost incurred during a spell in hospital
in the year prior to the survey was 2452 soms (median 1650
soms). Of this, the co-payment accounted for 19%, drugs 25%,
payments to personnel 25% and food 25%. Total expenditure on
hospitalization, excluding food, also varied by economic status
from a mean (median) of 1035 (700) soms for those living in
the poorest fifth of households to 2373 (1700) for those living
in the richest fifth of households (Figure 2). Thus, looking at
Table 4 Average amounts paid in relation to consultation with a health professional, amongst all who consulted, 2001, 2004 and 2007
Travel
expenses Consultation
Gift for
consultation
Other
payments
Other
gifts Prescriptions
Total
expenditure
2001
Median (soms) 0 0 0 0 0 25 50
Mean (soms) 13 24 7 9 1 94 148
Item share of total expenditure (%) 9 16 5 6 <1 64 100
2004
Median (soms) 0 0 0 0 0 70 0
Mean (soms) 13 31 4 13 1 183 245
Item share of total expenditure (%) 5 13 2 5 <1 75 100
2007
Median (soms) 0 0 0 0 0 70 0
Mean (soms) 26 38 3 23 2 228 355
Item share of total expenditure (%) 7 11 1 7 <1 64 100
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
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Figure 1 Proportion paying for services during hospitalization,
2001–2007.
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absolute levels of payment, hospital payments appear to be
progressive.
Given that one of the main purposes of the survey was to
provide data for the evaluation of the new co-payments for
inpatient stays, it is useful to examine the distribution of
payments in relation to the co-payment thresholds. Using the
current co-payment rates combined with information on patient
status, i.e. exempt, insured, uninsured, without referral and
whether or not the admission involved surgery, it is possible to
calculate the actual payment over and above the expected
co-payment. One way to assess the progress of the reform is to
look at how the excess payment varies by region (Figure 3 and
Table 8); as implementation of the reform was phased, we
might expect those regions where the reform was implemented
first to show a lower level of excess payment than those regions
where the reform was implemented last. Secondly, we can
assess equity by looking at the distribution of payment in
excess of the co-payment by socio-economic group (Table 9).
There are several points to note. First, substantial expenses
over and above the co-payment rate are being incurred for
hospital stays, particularly in Bishkek and Chui. However,
median levels of payment are much lower than mean pay-
ments, indicating that a considerable proportion of patients are
paying nothing or very little over and above the co-payment
Table 6 Proportion of inpatients making a payment/gift to staff during hospitalization, with mean (median) values amongst those who have paid,
by economic status quintile (%), 2007
Poorest 20% Richest 20% All Kyrgyzstan
% paying Mean (median) % paying Mean (median) % paying Mean (median)
Physician services 20 8 13
Cash 293 (200) 427 (500) 352 (300)
In-kind 118 (100) 225 (200) 175 (150)
Surgeon 10 18 14
Cash 1185 (300) 5527 (1000) 3372 (1000)
In-kind 528 (500) 392 (350) 475 (350)
Paediatrician 2 7 5
Cash 128 (100) 374 (500) 262 (150)
In-kind 102 (100) 120 (120) 119 (100)
Gynaecologist 18 22 18
Cash 191 (200) 1072 (500) 586 (200)
In-kind 129 (100) 174 (150) 196 (150)
Anaesthesiologist 2 9 5
Cash 197 (200) 454 (300) 489 (300)
In-kind – 108 (100) 176 (200)
Ancillary staff 6 10 8
Cash 99 (100) 159 (100) 196 (100)
In-kind 68 (50) 97 (120) 95 (100)
Other payments 11 11 17
Cash 1544 (500) 1288 (200) 702 (200)
In-kind 211 (100) 237 (200) 236 (200)
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
Table 5 Proportion paying for services during hospitalization, with mean (median) values amongst those who have paid, by economic status
quintile (%) 2007
Poorest 20% Richest 20% All Kyrgyzstan
% paying Mean (median) % paying Mean (median) % paying Mean (median)
Hospital charges 66 491 (500) 70 1076 (750) 67 751 (530)
Food 82 552 (400) 98 785 (600) 93 644 (500)
Medicines 59 568 (450) 59 1063 (500) 57 988 (500)
Other supplies 65 114 (100) 68 125 (60) 67 121 (60)
Laboratory tests 23 126 (100) 31 197 (120) 31 135 (90)
Comfortable room 0 10 700 (700) 4 728 (700)
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
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rates, but a few people are paying substantial amounts (see
third column in Table 8). Secondly, if one excludes spending on
food, then hospital expenditures are much lower and indeed
median excess payments are zero everywhere except Talas,
Bishkek and Chui—indicating that at least half of all inpatients
do not pay more than the co-payment rate. Thus there is some
evidence that the system of co-payments is impacting upon
out-of-pocket payments related to hospitalization. However,
there are still some poor people making significant payments
(Table 9).
Discussion
On balance, analysis of the KIHS health module data over the
period 2001–2007 shows encouraging signs that access to
health care and equity within the health sector in the Kyrgyz
Republic has improved. With regard to primary care, financial
barriers to access are decreasing. The percentage of patients
who report making a payment to a state provider fell between
2004 and 2007 and financial access to maternity care increased.
The operation of the system of exemptions has improved and
very few people report making gifts—indicating a decline in
these types of informal payment. However, although overall
financial access for outpatient treatment has improved, the
burden of health care payments for the poor is still significant.
With regard to hospitalization, in the 12 months prior to
March 2007, those in the richest households are 50% more
likely to have had an inpatient stay than those in the poorest
households (Table 2), indicating that barriers to access still
remain. The good news is that fewer inpatients report making
payments to medical personnel, but when payments are made
they are high, especially to surgeons and anaesthetists. The
overall out-of-pocket costs of inpatient care have fallen slightly
and equity has improved. More than half of all inpatients are
not making payment in excess of the co-payment rate; however,
there are still some poor people making significant payments.
The Manas Taalimi sets out the reform agenda for 2006–2010
(Ministry of Health 2006). This ‘next generation’ of reforms
aims to increase the effectiveness of primary health care, with
a particular emphasis on building the capacity of feldsher-
obstetrical points (FAPs) and ambulance services, and to
increase funding for health care through improved revenue
collection and improved purchasing of services with the
guaranteed basic package. The Manas Taalimi explicitly lays
out the goal of enhancing transparency in the allocation and
use of funds within the health sector through the development
of clear regulatory mechanisms for budget allocations.
Table 8 Average payments in excess of co-payment rates by region,
2007 (soms)
Expenditure incl. food Expenditure excl. food
Mean Median Max Mean Median Max
Issyk-Kul 1119 200 13 423 846 0 12 423
Jalal-Abad 642 160 6161 515 0 5761
Talas 1224 880 9711 968 580 8711
Batken 695 0 8561 389 0 8061
Naryn 989 130 8861 654 0 7861
Bishkek 1936 1230 13 350 1346 600 11 850
Chui 3287 202 20 200 2473 1120 17 210
All Kyrgyzstan 1688 890 20 200 1185 290 17 210
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
Note: The appropriate co-payment rates were calculated taking into account
whether the co-payment was for admission with diagnosis and treatment
only, or for admission with surgery and taking into account the patient’s
status, i.e. exempt, insured, uninsured or without referral.
Table 7 Amongst those inpatients who paid, reasons why payments in
cash or kind to selected health care staff were made, 2007 (%)
It was
a gift
Person
asked
for it
Person
hinted
for it
Difficult
to say Total
Physician services 65 5 17 13 100
Surgeon 55 22 13 11 100
Paediatrician 84 13 2 1 100
Gynaecologist 63 12 15 9 100
Anaesthesiologist 44 47 2 7 100
Ancillary staff 67 19 9 5 100
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
Table 9 Average payments in excess of co-payment rates by
socio-economic group (soms)
Expenditure incl. food Expenditure excl. food
Mean Median Max Mean Median Max
Poorest 20% 891 462 13 423 531 30 12 423
Quintile 2 1169 340 13 350 835 0 11 850
Quintile 3 1520 710 8862 1014 170 7861
Quintile 4 1462 910 9911 1008 470 8011
Richest 20% 2404 1600 9973 1670 1000 9420
Source: authors’ own analysis KIHS.
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Although other countries within the Central Asian region
have implemented reform of their health care systems, it is
arguable that outside of the Kyrgyz Republic there has been
little significant progress in increasing the efficiency or effect-
iveness of the health sector, and that informal payments
remain pervasive (Bonilla-Chacin et al. 2005). What lessons
therefore are there from the Kyrgyz experience for the region
more generally? One important characteristic of the Kyrgyz
reforms is that they have been implemented over an extended
period and have taken an incremental approach, piloting the
changes in one locality before gradually implementing them
nationally. Thus the first demonstration project of health
insurance started in Issyk-Kul oblast in 1994; the Single
Payer reform (which ended up with a different structure to
the original pilot) was only fully implemented a decade later in
2003. Data have been used to evaluate the reforms and modify
the reform design. The availability of time series data on both
financial flows and patient episodes from the MHIF, along with
household level data from the KIHS, has provided a rich
evidence base with which to inform policy. The presence of the
WHO Health Policy Analysis Project within the Ministry of
Health building has further strengthened the analytical base,
along with extensive capacity building within both the Ministry
of Health and MHIF (Kutzin et al. 2009).
A further important factor in the successful implementation
of the reform process has been the usually high level of
co-ordination and co-operation between the government and
all the key international and bilateral donors working in
the health sector in Kyrgyzstan. Early on in the process, the
MANAS Programme became the umbrella project for all the
various actors and this has meant that all the activities have
focused on achieving the same set of goals. The MANAS
Programme contributed to the Poverty Reduction Strategy, and
the Monitoring Indicator Package for the Manas Taalimi
includes indicators that are also part of the Comprehensive
Development Framework (the successor to the Poverty
Reduction Strategy). This joined-up thinking has helped
ensure that improving access to health services remains at the
centre of policy development.
The Kyrgyz health sector has been at the forefront of reforms
within the region and it is hoped that this emphasis on the
achievement of equity and accessibility of health services for
the entire population continues. It is clear from the analysis
presented here that the Single Payer reform has succeeded in
formalizing some informal payments but there is still scope for
further progress. A further KIHS health module is planned for
2010 as part of the monitoring and evaluation framework
for Manas Taalimi. Analysis of that survey will shed light on
the extent of out-of-pocket payments over and above the
official co-payment level, and thus how much more work needs
to be done to drive out informal payments.
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